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In lab experiments on the value of information in financial markets, 
groups of “insiders” are randomly chosen to receive perfect information. 
However, in typical (non-experimental) financial markets, investors often 
engage in extensive fundamental analysis, a process which may result in over-
confidence in one’s private information. In this study, we examine trading 
volume, prices and trader returns in a set of four real money prediction 
markets where the values of securities are tied to a movie’s box office 
performance. Before the markets opened, every trader submitted a detailed 
forecast of the movie’s future performance. Therefore, all traders have self-
generated private information, the accuracy of which can only be known ex-
post.  
Trading volume and timing were consistent with over-confidence. In three 
of the four markets, contract prices were consistent with the prior information 
equilibrium, another indication of trader over-confidence in their private 
information. In those three markets, traders whose forecasts were associated 
with the winning contract had significantly higher returns than traders with 
less accurate forecasts. In the fourth market, there were no significant 
differences in returns.  
This research shows how having different private information across 
traders produces winners and losers. Gathering private information leads to 
over-confidence across all traders regardless of the ex-post accuracy of their 
forecast. When all traders are over-confident, those with a better forecast do 
not have to be certain of their informational advantage to profit from it. In 
comparison, despite their efforts and confidence in their private information, 
traders with worse information have significantly worse outcomes.   
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The controversy over the role of information in financial markets has been 
active for almost four decades. Fama (1970) famously declared that market 
efficiency makes information gathering useless (or at least profitless) since all 
information is revealed by market prices. Since that time, there has been a 
continuing debate on the topic. For example, Grossman (Grossman 1976; 
Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) suggests that fully efficient markets cannot exist 
since a lack of returns would prevent anyone from gathering costly 
information. Without such efforts, the market would have no information to 
reveal through prices. This is a central issue in finance given the enormous 
resources devoted to fundamental security analysis (Figlewski 1982) and the 
continuing belief that “information is the most important ingredient to achieve 
above-average returns” (Huber 2007: 2538).  
In a separate stream of research, behavioral finance researchers have 
focused their attention on the effects of individual biases as an explanation for 
differences in investor returns. For example, studies of individual brokerage 
accounts show that increased trading activity due to overconfidence leads to 
lower investor returns (Barber and Odean 2000). In related research, 
overconfidence has been associated with past investing success (Barber and 
Odean 2002) and gender (Barber and Odean 2001a).  
In this paper, we build on these important streams of research by 
examining how overconfidence and disparate private information affect trader 
returns in prediction markets. The source of overconfidence we consider is the 
effort made by a trader to generate a forecast, i.e. fundamental analysis. When 
trading, overconfident investors rely heavily on their private information 
(Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998) leading to a high volume of 
trading (Odean 1998). If this is the case, market prices would be consistent 
with the prior information equilibrium, i.e. reflecting the distribution of the 
traders’ private information (Plott and Sunder 1982; Huber 2007). In such 
situations, we expect that traders with more accurate forecasts should have 
significantly higher returns than traders with less accurate forecasts. 
We test our conjectures using data from a small-scale, real money 
prediction market operated by a U.S. university as a research and teaching 
tool. Our focus is a set of 4 movie box office futures markets conducted in 
1998 and 2000. In each market, a set of 4-5 Arrow-Debreu contracts were 
offered. The payoff for each contract was tied to a range of 4-week box office 
results for the focal movie. All of the traders in these markets were graduate 
business students who, in exchange for their trading accounts, created and 
turned in detailed forecasts before trading began. Using this unique data, we 
can examine how differences in forecast accuracy affect trader returns when 
all traders have engaged in fundamental analysis, albeit of future movie box 




office receipts as opposed to the future performance of securities in equity 
capital markets.  
We examined the returns of traders based upon which contract their 
forecast suggested would finish in the money. In three of the four markets we 
studied, the market prices of the contracts were consistent with the prior 
information equilibrium. In those markets, traders whose forecasts were 
associated with the winning contract had significantly higher returns than 
traders whose forecasts suggested that another contract would pay off. In the 
one market where prices were not consistent with the prior information 
equilibrium, there were no significant differences in returns between the 
traders associated with the winning contract and the other traders.  
The contributions of this study lie in two areas. First, we show that when 
all traders have engaged in fundamental analysis before the onset of market 
participation, the volume and timing of trading as well as the resulting market 
prices are consistent with the analytical models of how trader overconfidence 
affects financial markets (Odean 1998; Daniel et al. 1998). We add to the 
laboratory research on the value of information in financial markets (Ackert, 
et al. 2002; Copeland and Friedman 1992; Huber 2007; Huber, et al. 2008; 
Plott and Sunder 1982) by showing that traders who have more accurate 
information have significantly higher returns even when the traders’ 
informational advantage can only be known ex-post. This is an important 
finding since in most prior research the information advantage provided to 
“insiders” was substantial (i.e., perfect information) and this information 
advantage was common knowledge among the other traders. When all traders 
are overconfident and trade accordingly, there can be significant rewards to 
being better informed.  
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews prior 
research on the value of information in markets, the relationship between 
effort and overconfidence and the effects of overconfidence. Section 3 
provides background information on the movie box office futures markets. In 
Section 4, we present our results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our 
findings.   
 
2 THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 
In his seminal 1970 paper on the efficient market hypothesis, Fama (1970) 
suggests that efforts by investors to gather information would be fruitless 
since all information is already reflected in market prices. The fully-revealing 
nature of prices under strong form market efficiency leads to a paradox, first 
described by Grossman and Stiglitz (Grossman 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980). If better informed traders are unable to benefit from their superior 
information, what is the incentive to gather costly information? Clearly, none 
exists in a fully efficient market. However, if no one has the incentive to 
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gather costly information, the market would have no information to reveal 
through prices.  
One way to resolve this paradox is to assume that markets are populated 
with asymmetrically informed traders. For example, Radner (1979) shows that 
when traders have different information about the value of a financial 
security, trading will reveal the information held by a sub-set of traders to all 
traders. These findings suggest that, under the rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE), better informed traders will have the same returns as less 
well informed traders.  
An experimental study by Plott and Sunder (1982) confirms that 
uninformed traders are able to learn from the actions of perfectly informed 
“insiders.” The prices in these markets converged to a fully-revealing REE. 
Furthermore, consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, there were no 
significant differences in returns between informed and uninformed traders.  
Since then, a number of authors have studied the interactions between 
informed and uninformed traders (e.g. Ackert, Church and Zhang 2002; 
Copeland and Friedman 1992). More recently, Huber and his colleagues 
(Huber 2007; Huber, Kirckler and Sutter 2008) have been considering 
whether having more information can actually hurt a trader’s returns. They 
base their studies on a model by Schredelseker (2001) in which a fully 
informed insider can earn higher returns from his informational advantage 
while completely uninformed traders earn the market return. This implies that 
traders with some level of information between complete ignorance and 
complete information must have returns less than the market average. 
In their market experiments, Huber and his colleagues vary the amount or 
timing of information provided to traders. In Huber, Kirckler and Sutter 
(2008), they find that having more information - short of complete 
information - does not necessarily increase a trader’s returns. When 
information timing is manipulated across traders (Huber 2007), the returns 
have a J-shape, showing that traders receiving information somewhat later 
have significantly lower returns even when compared to traders receiving the 
information with a longer time lag. These results are very interesting since 
they show that relaxing the assumption of two levels of information (informed 
and uninformed) leads to an advantage that insiders could consistently exploit, 
a result at odds with the theory of the REE and the experimental findings of 
Plott and Sunder (1982).   
The presence of informational “insiders” is a critical abstraction in the 
theoretical and experimental research on the value of information in financial 
markets. In the experimental research, insiders are randomly selected to 
receive perfect information. Given ex-ante perfect information, these inside 
traders can be confident of their advantage over others. However, the clear 
advantage of these insiders raises an important question: What happens when 
traders can only know the accuracy of their information ex-post? Are better 
informed traders able to benefit from an information advantage that is only 
revealed ex-post?  




With ex-ante perfect information, traders can have complete confidence in 
the value of their information. Moreover, this advantage is unearned. 
However, in traditional financial markets, traders decide how much effort (or 
expense) to expend on information gathering (Huber 2007). Therefore, a 
logical next step in this stream of research is to examine endogenous 
differences in information across traders (Huber 2007: 2561).   
We expect that the uncertainty introduced by self-generated information 
raises the possibility that traders will overestimate the value of their 
information and trade in an overconfident manner. Extant studies of actual 
individual behavior (e.g. Barber and Odean 2000; 2001a; 2002) reveal that 
investors frequently exhibit over-confident behavior. However, these studies 
lack reliable measures of informational differences across traders. Therefore, 
it is unclear the extent to which some of the observed variations in investor 
returns may be attributed to information asymmetries rather than 
overconfidence.  
In our study, we explore a middle ground between the abstractions of the 
experimental work and the inability to measure differences in information 
across individual stock market investors. In contrast to the experimental 
research, our traders come to the market with different, self-generated private 
information which we measure before trading begins. They do not know a 
priori the accuracy of their forecasts. In the next section, we argue that the 
process of engaging in fundamental analysis will make traders overconfident. 
We expect this overconfidence will affect the volume and timing of trading, 
observed market prices and, ultimately, the returns to better information. 
 
2.1 EFFORT AND OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
In experimental markets, one’s informational advantage is generally not 
due to one’s efforts, i.e. due to random assignment. In conventional financial 
markets, investors may commit a great deal of effort to fundamental analysis 
in order to improve one’s returns (Barber and Odean 2001b). Research on the 
psychology of decision making suggests that such efforts are likely to make 
one overconfident in the accuracy of any information that is generated by the 
individual (Paese and Sniezek 1991).  
People expect that a high level of effort should result in better 
performance. For example, Yates and Kulick (1977) show that subjects 
believe that returns to effort increase at an increasing rate. In Switzer and 
Sniezek (1991), subjects believe the relationship between their effort and 
output on clerical tasks to be strong and positive. In reality, output does not 
always vary with effort.  
When forecasting a future event, a person may expect a positive 
relationship between one’s efforts and forecasting accuracy. While 
performance can increase with increased effort for many tasks, there is no 
reason to expect that increased efforts can result in more accurate forecasts of 
uncertain future events (Paese and Sniezek 1991). In a study of forecasting the 
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future performance of baseball pitchers, Paese and Sniezek (1991: 118) find 
that “when highly uncertain quantities are predicted, confidence may increase 
with self-assessments of effort, even though accuracy may be unlikely to 
improve.” In fact, “(d)espite higher confidence, those who reported high effort 
were not necessarily more accurate, as there was no relation between effort 
and accuracy in predictive judgment” (Paese and Sniezek 1991: 124).  
In a controlled lab experiment, Cipriano (2006) compared the efforts of 
subjects required to supply an explanation of their fundamental analysis of the 
earnings of a company with those who are not required to supply such an 
explanation. He found that the explanation requirement lead to significantly 
more effort. Effort was measured by the amount of time that subjects spent 
viewing information relevant to the company for whom the forecast was being 
created. The correlation between explanation requirement and time spent 
viewing information was positive and significant (0.53, p < 0.0001). This 
study suggests that when the act of forecasting a future outcome is 
accompanied by an explanation of the forecast, traders will put significantly 
more effort into their forecasts.   
In the context of fundamental analysis, we expect that when investors are 
asked to justify their forecast of a future event, the investors will put a great 
deal of effort into this task. Due to a high level of effort, they will be highly 
confident of their forecast. In fact, we expect that the high level of effort will 
lead to overconfidence on the part of the individual trader. This 
overconfidence will be manifested in the market in multiple ways, discussed 
in the next section.    
 
2.2 THE EFFECTS OF OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
Once one has made a judgment, one’s confidence can affect how new 
information is processed (Shaklee and Fischhoff 1982). In a market setting, 
this would mean that traders would primarily rely on their private information 
rather than update their forecast using information from other traders (or 
public information) as communicated by market prices (Odean 1998; Daniel 
et al. 1998).   
Under the fully revealing REE, price is a sufficient statistic for all 
information (Sunder 1995). All traders would become quickly informed of the 
intrinsic values of the market securities and there would be little, if any 
trading absent significant differences in liquidity needs or risk preferences 
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985). In contrast, if overconfident traders 
bring heterogeneous information to the market and trade based on this 
information, we would expect a high volume of trading (Odean 1998).  
At the aggregate level, we expect that prices in a market populated by 
overconfident traders would be consistent with the prior information 
equilibrium (Forsythe et al. 1982, Plott and Sunder 1982; 1988; Huber 2007). 
The prior information equilibrium arises when traders focus solely on their 
private information. They, “ignore the possibility that market prices, by 




aggregating information from other traders, also contain information,” (Palan 
2009: 26-27).  
Overconfidence leads traders to put more weight on one’s own forecasts 
versus those of others (Daniel et al. 1998). Furthermore, overconfident traders 
will rely more upon private information that he or she has personally created 
than on publicly available information (Daniel et al. 1998). Trading solely on 
private information should results in prices consistent with the prior 
information equilibrium.    
Finally, we expect that investors trading on the basis of disparate private 
information will have varying returns depending on whether their original 
forecasts were accurate or not. This would be consistent with markets where 
traders had different timing of information (Huber 2007). In those markets, 
when traders used “naïve trading” or trading based on their own private 
information, the distribution of returns reflected the variations in information 
timing across groups of traders who obtained information earlier profiting at 
the expense of traders who had to wait for information (Huber 2007: 2545). 
When traders bring their own information to a market, we expect that those 
with more accurate forecasts should be able to leverage their informational 
advantage and profit from trading with others whose forecasts are less 
accurate.    
 
3 MARKET OVERVIEW 
 
The setting for our study is a small-scale, real money futures market 
operated by a U.S. university. Participants may trade futures contracts whose 
value is tied to a future event such as a political contest, changes in Federal 
Reserve policy or the box office performance of a movie.  
All trading is conducted via an anonymous, computerized double auction 
which accepts both market and limit orders. All limit orders (bids/asks) are 
queued by price and submission times. The best bid and ask prices are 
available to traders as are past daily average prices and transaction levels. An 
individual’s investment in the market is limited to $500 and no short selling is 
allowed. In addition, no transactions fees are charged to traders.  
Traders may acquire contracts from the market in a bundle consisting of 
one of each of the contracts in the market. A complete bundle of contracts 
may be purchased from or sold to the exchange at any time for $1, the 
guaranteed liquidation value of the bundle. Therefore, the supply of contracts 
in the market expands and shrinks as traders desire without contaminating the 
individual contract prices as set by the traders. 
 
3.1 MOVIE BOX OFFICE MARKETS 
 
We focus on a set of four movie box office markets that were offered to 
traders in 1998 and 2000. Each market was intended to predict the domestic 
box office performance of a particular movie in its first 4 weeks of release. In 
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each market, a bundle of four or five contracts was offered. Each contract is 
associated with a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive range of box 
office receipts within the specified four-week period.  
For example, in a market conducted in the fall of 1998, there were 4 
contracts associated with the movie Enemy of the State. Their definitions are 
given in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Contracts in the Enemy of the State Market 
 
EOS25L $1.00 if "Enemy of the State" domestic box office 
receipts for the 11/20-12/17 period are lower than or 
equal to $25 million; zero otherwise 
EOS40L $1.00 if "Enemy of the State" domestic box office 
receipts for the 11/20-12/17 period are higher than $25 
million and lower than or equal to $40 million; zero 
otherwise 
EOS55L $1.00 if "Enemy of the State" domestic box office 
receipts for the 11/20-12/17 period are higher than $40 
million and lower than or equal to $55 million; zero 
otherwise 
EOS70L $1.00 if "Enemy of the State" domestic box office 
receipts for the 11/20-12/17 period are higher than $55 
million and lower than or equal to $70 million; zero 
otherwise 
EOS70H $1.00 if "Enemy of the State"  domestic box office 
receipts for the 11/20-12/17 period are higher than $70 
million; zero otherwise 
 
At the end of the market, only one of the contracts pays off $1 while the 
others expire worthless. Therefore, the bundle of contracts is a set of outcome-
spanning Arrow-Debreu securities. Prior research by Plott and Sunder (1988) 
suggests that asset markets using this contract framework can successfully 
aggregate information from individual traders. 
 
3.2 TRADERS AND FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 
In these movie box office markets, all traders were graduate business 
students who were provided a $10 trading account (They could add more 




funds to the $500 market limit). In exchange, these traders were required to 
submit a forecast of the 4-week box office performance supported by a 2-4 
page justification. (A sample assignment and further details are available from 
the authors.) In addition, these traders were also asked to execute at least two 
transactions while the market was open (buying or selling a bundle of 
contracts is considered a transaction). 
Prior research suggests that an explanation requirement elicits more 
cognitive effort on the part of subjects in a wide variety of settings (e.g., 
Ashton 1990; Chang et al. 1997; Tuttle et al. 1997). In the context of financial 
forecasts, Daniel et al. (1998 : 1841) suggest that an investor will be, ‘more 
overconfident about signals or assessments with which he has greater personal 
involvement.” Consequently, we expect that all traders in our markets will be 
overconfident of the accuracy of their forecasts.  
We have a limited amount of survey data from traders in the 2000 movie 
box office markets to support this assertion. After the forecasts were 
submitted and before the market opened, the student traders completed a short 
survey. The survey included questions assessing their confidence in the 
accuracy of their forecast for each movie as well as perceived time spent and 
information used to complete the forecasting assignment (relative to other 
students). In addition, the students were asked about their anticipated trading 
activity and interest in seeing the movies. The survey questions are available 
from the authors.  
The survey results are consistent with our assumption that increased effort 
leads to overconfidence. For both movies (How the Grinch and The 6th Day), 
the majority of traders indicated they were somewhat confident or very 
confident that their forecast was accurate (86%, 77% respectively). For both 
movies, confidence in forecast accuracy was significantly correlated (p < 
0.001) with the perceived time spent (r = 0.40, 0.31 respectively) and amount 
of information used (r = 0.43, 0.30 respectively). While limited, this survey 
data supports our conjecture that the time and effort one expends in creating 
and justifying a forecast will lead to overconfidence in its accuracy.  
The first step in the market timeline is the submission of the traders’ 
forecasts. Once the forecasts are turned in to the experimenter, the movie box 
office market opens. Trading began up to two weeks before the opening of the 
movie in theaters (all of these movies opened on a Friday). Once the movie 
opened in theaters, trading continued for four weeks.  
Nielsen/EDI (entdata.com) tracked movie box office performance on a 
weekly basis. Daily estimates are also available at other web sites, e.g. the-
numbers.com. After the final 4-week receipts are available in print (through 
Variety), the markets are liquidated. This entails exchanging $1 for each 
winning contract held by a trader. Nothing is paid for losing contracts.  
 
3.3 MARKET TIMELINE 
 
The timeline of the market is provided in Figure 2. 
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Our study focuses on four movie box office markets. Two of these 
markets were offered in 1998 and two in 2000. Details about the markets are 
provided in Table 1 
 
Table 1: Overview of Movie Box Office Markets 
 
Movie I Still Know 
What You Did 
Last Summer 





The Sixth Day 
Date market 
opened 




11/13/1998 11/20/1998 11/17/2000 11/17/2000 
Date market 
closed 
12/10/1998 12/17/1998 12/14/2000 12/14/2000 
Number of 
contracts 
4 5 5 5 
Number of 
traders 










41% 64% 74% 66% 
* Bundles of contracts excluded 




In these markets, every trader generated a written forecast for both 
movies. However, the traders were free to choose in which markets they 
would participate. This accounts for the differences in the number of traders 
across markets. 
 
4.1 TRADING VOLUME AND TIMING  
 
We conjecture that their forecasting efforts would result in trader 
overconfidence. One of the indicators of overconfidence is a high volume of 
trading activity. Note that traders were only required to make two trades 
which included the buying or selling of a bundle of contracts. However, the 
overall average number of trades was very high. There were a total of 88 
traders in the 1998 markets (I Still Know and Enemy of the State) who traded a 
total of 3831 contracts, an average of 43.5 contracts per trader. The 91 traders 
in the 2000 markets (How the Grinch and The 6th Day) traded an average of 
24.9 contracts. These volume figures do not include buying contract bundles 
from or selling bundles to the exchange. This high volume of trading is 
consistent with overconfidence.  
To determine if the traders were overconfident as a group, we examined 
the timing of trading in the markets. Before a movie opens in theaters, there is 
little public information for traders to incorporate into prices. During the time 
between the commencement of trading and the opening of the movie in 
theaters, much of the trading would be driven by differences in private 
information across traders. In contrast, once a movie opens in theaters, there is 
a great deal of public information available to traders to determine which 
contract will finish in the money. For example, the results from the first 
weekend’s box office provide a very revealing signal regarding the 4-week 
total box office performance (Krider and Weinberg, 1988; Pennock et al. 
2001).  
Given the information content of the first weekend’s performance data, a 
rational trader who is unsure of the accuracy of his or her forecast would wait 
until estimates of these results become available (Copeland and Freidman 
1987). In contrast, overconfident traders would focus more of their trading 
activity in the pre-opening period to position their portfolios to benefit from 
their perceived informational advantage over other traders.  
To assess the timing of the trading in these markets, we compared the 
volume of contracts traded before a movie opened in theaters to the total 
volume of contracts traded for the entire time period of the market (See Table 
1). This proportion ranged from 41% in the I Still Know market to 74% in the 
How the Grinch market. Given the concentration of trading before reliable 
public information is available to traders, we conclude that the timing of 
trading volume in these markets is consistent with overconfidence. 
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4.2 EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Overconfident investors are more likely to base their trades on their 
private information rather than either public information or the private 
information of other traders (Daniel et al.1998). Unlike experimental markets 
(e.g. Plott and Sunder 1982; Huber 2007), we do not provide traders with their 
private information. By controlling the trader’s information and through the 
design of their securities, these authors create a clear distinction in prices 
between the REE and the prior information equilibrium. For our markets, we 
are limited to testing whether there are significant deviations in the observed 
market prices from those we would expect under the prior information 
equilibrium.  
If, as we assume, traders in these markets are primarily using their private 
forecasts to guide their trading, then we should expect that the distribution of 
forecasts would be reflected in the distribution of contract prices, i.e. the 
Walrasian equilibrium (Grossman 1981: 546-548). For example, consider the 
market for the Enemy of the State movie. If 50% of the traders predict that the 
movie would make $70 million or more in its first 4 weeks of release, then we 
should expect that the price for the corresponding contract would be $0.50.  
For each movie, we partitioned the distribution of the traders’ point 
forecasts using the same cut points as the contracts in the movie box office 
markets. (Note that the traders did not know how the contracts would be 
defined before trading began.) For comparison, we computed the (normalized) 
last transaction prices at midnight on Thursday before the movie opened in 
theaters. We compared the cumulative distributions of the trader forecasts and 
the contract prices using the one-sample Kolomogrov-Smirnov D test. The 
sample size was the number of trader forecasts. The results are presented in 
Table 2. 
The null hypothesis (H0) for this non-parametric test is that the 
distribution of forecasts is the same as the distribution of contract prices. This 
would result from traders relying on their private information. We fail to reject 
this hypothesis for three of the four movies (p < 0.05). For the movie I Still 
Know, the difference is significant at the p < 0.05 level. These findings 
suggest that, consistent with overconfidence, contract pricing in three of the 
markets does not significantly differ from prices we would observe under the 
prior information equilibrium. The  correspondence between the observed 
contract prices and distribution of point forecasts is surprisingly close given 
we do not have to control for individual differences across traders (e.g. trading 
activity, wealth, etc.). 
 
4.3 TRADER RETURNS  
 
To measure the returns for the individual trader, we used a simple 
measure similar to operating margin. The numerator consists of the proceeds 
of all contract sales, bundle sales to the exchange and proceeds from the 




liquidation of winning contracts. The denominator consists of payments to the 
exchange for bundles and individual contracts purchased from other traders. A 
trader who breaks even has a return of 1 while one who makes (loses) money 
has a return of more (less) than 1. By construction, the return for the market as 
a whole is unity. This measure accounts for differences in the amount of 
trading activity across investors. Furthermore, we ignore any discounting 
since the $1 risk-free bundle of contracts sells for $1 for the duration of the 
market. This implies that the risk-free alternative in this market bears a zero 
interest rate (Bonderenko and Bossaerts 2000). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Distribution of Trader Forecasts and Market Contract 
Prices  
 
































































Fail to Reject H0 


























Fail to Reject H0 

























Fail to Reject H0 
* indicates contract that paid $1 (winning contract).  
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The volume of trading activity and the timing of trades are consistent with 
overconfident traders in all four markets we studied. In three of these markets, 
the contract prices before the movies opened in theaters are consistent with 
the prior information equilibrium. In the fourth market (I Still Know), the 
observed market prices differ significantly from the distribution of traders 
forecasts.  
If overconfident traders are primarily relying on their private information 
(i.e., forecasts), then traders whose forecasts lie within the boundaries of the 
winning contract should have higher returns. We compared the average 
returns for traders with accurate forecasts - those whose forecasts fell within 
the boundaries of the contract that ultimately finished in the money - with all 
other traders. Since the returns are not normally distributed, we used the 
Mann-Whitney U-test. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Trader Returns 
 
Movie Market Average return 














I Still Know What 




























1 Sample size in parentheses 
2 p-value in parentheses 
 
As expected, the average returns for traders with accurate forecasts were 
significantly higher (p < 0.03) in the three markets (Enemy of the State, How 
the Grinch, The 6th Day) in which pricing is consistent with the prior 
information equilibrium.  
Furthermore, we find that this same comparison is not significant (p < 
0.11) for the I Still Know market. This should not be a surprise since the 
prices in this market are not consistent with the prior information equilibrium. 
In such a situation, we should not expect there to be a significant difference in 
trader returns based on private information.  
There are two possible explanations for the results we observe in the I Still 
Know market. One possibility is that the market was actually converging to 
prices consistent with the REE. This would be indicated by the difference of 
10% between the price of the winning contract (ISK50L) and the proportion 




of traders whose forecasts fell within the boundaries of that contract. 
However, there was a much larger difference (as a percentage) associated with 
the lowest denominated contract (ISK20L). While only 3% of trader forecasts 
fell within that contract’s boundaries, its normalized price was 4 times higher 
at 0.13. 
A second possible explanation is due to the short duration of the pre-
opening period, i.e. between the beginning of trading and the opening of the 
movie in theaters. In the I Still Know market, that time period was only 4 
days. The comparable time periods for the other markets were 10-14 days. It 
is possible that the market did not have time to converge to the expected prior 
information equilibrium.  
 
Table 4: Trader Returns by Contract Interval 
 
Market Contracts Average returns for 
traders with forecasts 
within contract limits 
Mann-Whitney U-Test 
p value of comparison 
with returns for traders 
associated with winning 
contract 

























































* indicates contract that paid $1 (winning contract) 
 
To better understand the relationship between forecast accuracy and trader 
returns, we segmented every market into four or five groups based on the 
number of contracts offered in the market. The statistical tests reported in 
Table 3 evaluate the returns of traders with accurate forecasts with those of 
traders whose forecast did not fall within the bounds of the winning contract. 
We expect that if a group of trader forecasts are far from the range embodied 
by the winning contract, their returns will be lower.  
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We tested this hypothesis by comparing the returns from the traders with 
accurate forecasts with separate groups of traders, each defined by having a 
forecast within the range of a given contract. Since the returns are not 
normally distributed (and sample sizes can be small), we used the Mann-
Whitney U statistic. The results are presented in Table 4. (Note that we did 
not include the returns in the I Still Know market. They are available from the 
authors).  
We see that for every market, the average return for traders with an 
accurate forecast are higher than the average for any other group of traders. In 
the Enemy of the State market, returns for all groups of traders whose forecast 
fell below $55 million had significantly lower returns (p < 0.051). For the 
group of traders with forecasts falling between $55 million and $70 million, 
the difference was not significant (p < 0.295).  
 In the market for How the Grinch Stole Christmas, the average returns 
for all groups of traders whose forecasts fell below $110 million were 
significantly lower (p < 0.006). 
 For traders in the market for The Sixth Day, forecasting a 4-week total 
between $50 million and $90 million resulted in a significant reduction in 
returns. It is interesting to note that the average returns for the small group of 
traders with a forecast exceeding $90 million is not significantly different 
from those with an accurate forecast (p < 0.422).  
 One possible reason for this outcome is that some of these traders 
abandoned their forecasts and incorporated information from the other traders. 
For example, one of the traders in this group made only one purchase during 
the entire market. Fortunately, the contract that was purchased for $0.22 
turned out to be the winning contract resulting in a return of 4.54. While such 
behavior is inconsistent with overconfidence, it suggests that, while traders 
tended to be focused on their own private information, there are important 
variations in individual behavior.  
 Examining the pattern of returns based on the proximity to the 
winning contract, we see two things. First, of the 10 groups of traders whose 
forecast lay outside the range of the winning contract, the average returns for 
8 of the groups are significantly worse than the average returns for traders 
with accurate forecasts (p < 0.051). Second, of the 2 groups with average 
returns comparable to the traders with accurate forecasts, one is associated 
with a contract directly adjacent to the winning contract (EOS70L). Based on 
these results, we conclude that the further away a trader’s forecast is from the 
boundaries of the winning contract, the more likely it is that trader will have 
significantly lower returns.  
 If we combine the results from Table 4 with the forecast distributions 
from Table 2, we see that the proportions of traders whose returns seem to 
have been affected by the degree of inaccuracy of their forecasts are, in time 
order, 23% (Enemy of the State), 48% (How the Grinch), and 75% (The Sixth 
Day). The results from Table 4 combined with the findings presented in Table 
3 suggest that when traders are overconfident (as a group), fundamental 




analysis can be very beneficial if your efforts result in accurate information. 
For most traders who did not generate an accurate forecast, the efforts towards 
fundamental analysis were not only profitless but, ultimately, return reducing.  
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study differs from current research about the impact of information 
on trading outcomes in a number of important ways. First, the information 
asymmetries across traders arose naturally and were not due to random chance 
as in prior lab experiments. Second, the accuracy of a trader’s private 
information can only be known ex-post, as is the case in traditional financial 
markets. Third, and most critical, a trader’s private information was a result of 
the time and effort he or she took to prepare a forecast and justify it in writing. 
This very task makes a trader overconfident in the quality of one’s private 
information which is a central focus of research in behavioral finance (Odean 
1998; Daniel et al. 1998). In this unique setting, we are able to measure a 
traders’ private information and examine its impact on trading in a setting 
where “all traders are above average” (Odean 1998). Thus, we have much of 
the realism of larger financial markets (disparate private information, 
overconfidence born of reliance on personally created private information, 
real money incentives) combined with many of the controls of market 
experiments (finite lived assets, Arrow-Debreu securities, measures of private 
information).  
We find that, motivated by their efforts towards developing and justifying 
their forecasts, traders in these futures markets act in a manner consistent with 
over-confidence. The levels and timing of trading exceed those we would 
anticipate if traders had acted rationally under high levels of uncertainty 
(Copeland and Friedman 1992). Every trader was personally responsible for 
conducting a fundamental analysis of a financial outcome that determined the 
value of the contracts traded in the futures markets (i.e. the forecasting 
assignment). Consistent with Daniel et al. (1998), these traders focused on 
their own private information as indicated by prices consistent with the prior 
information equilibrium in three of the four markets we studied. In the 
markets where prices reflected the distribution of private information, the 
group of traders with accurate forecasts had significantly higher returns than 
traders with inaccurate forecasts. In the market wherein prices were not 
consistent with the prior information equilibrium, we did not observe 
significant differences in trader returns.  
The results in this paper suggest an alternative way to view the results in 
Huber (2007) about the value of more timely information. In Huber (2007), 
trading activity, market prices and trader returns were more consistent with 
the prior information equilibrium (“naïve trading” in his paper) than the REE. 
However, there is little discussion about why this is so. One unexplored 
possibility is that, despite the detailed instructions, traders did not understand 
the information structure. Another possible explanation is overconfidence.  
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It may be that the less well-informed traders in the market were 
overconfident in their ability to use prices to infer information possessed by 
the insiders. Our study shows that traders with more accurate forecasts were 
able to take advantage (through trading) of overconfident traders with less 
accurate forecasts. In Huber (2007), overconfidence on the part of the traders 
who received less timely information led them to trade even though they were 
at a known disadvantage versus the insiders. In both settings - our markets and 
Huber (2007) - it is the presence of overconfident, less well informed traders 
that enables traders with better information to gain from their advantage 
whether it was earned through effort or the result of random chance.  
Like all empirical studies, this work has potential limitations. The subjects 
are not professional traders. However, such equivalents do exist in larger 
financial markets. Perhaps our traders are more representative of the 
individual investor rather than professional institutional investors. It may be 
that these naïve investors are a source of lower quality or more widely varying 
information in markets. An additional concern may be the subject of the 
fundamental analysis, i.e. the box office performance of a particular movie. 
Unlike traditional financial instruments, each movie is unique and there is not 
a historical distribution of returns available to traders.  
Information plays a central role in finance. At the micro-level, the prices 
of traded assets convey information to traders and to observers of a market. At 
the macro-level, a very large part of the financial services industry is 
dedicated to providing information to investors. Despite the availability of 
such information, our understanding of whether a trader’s private information 
can be translated into better returns is quite limited. Due to the unique 
characteristics of these prediction markets and their participants, we can shed 
some light on the interactions among private, overconfidence and trader 
returns.  
Our study helps inform the debate regarding the role of information in 
financial markets. The requirement that traders engage in pre-trading 
forecasting enabled us to use our prediction markets to not only predict the 
box office performance of the movies but also to provide insights into the 
ways that information influences trading behavior and trading outcomes. The 
prospect for gain from having a better forecast motivated traders in our 
prediction markets to engage in fundamental research regarding the eventual 
outcome. Traders ended up having very different private information (i.e., 
forecasts) with respect to the value of the securities being exchanged in the 
market. Despite there being disagreement regarding the outcome being 
forecast, traders acted as if they were over-confident in the accuracy of their 
own private information. We find that the combination of these factors – 
differences across traders with respect to their private information and over-
confidence born of the process of gaining private information – allowed those 
with an informational advantage to profit from their forecasting efforts.  
These findings have implications for prediction markets in particular and 
financial markets in general. With respect to prediction markets, this study 




confirms the conjecture that traders who bring valuable (i.e. accurate) 
information to a prediction market are rewarded for their participation. This is 
an important result since without the participation of informed traders, 
prediction market prices cannot be expected to communicate useful 
information to participants and observers alike.  
With respect to financial markets, this study confirms the value of 
superior private information even in circumstances where traders can only 
know the accuracy of their private information ex post. At the same time, it 
must be noted that all traders in these markets generated their own private 
information. The process of creating a forecast and justifying it in writing 
appeared to create conditions favorable to over-confidence in one’s private 
information. Therefore, while all traders sought to gain an informational 
advantage over others, only some actually succeeded. Furthermore, it seems 
that the very process of seeking an informational advantage over other traders 
provides the opportunity, through over-confident trading, for better informed 
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